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Conceptual Analysis for Nanoscience
The synthesis, characterization, and interpretation ofnanoscale materials necessarily draw from both bulk and
molecular descriptions of matter. Researchers choose which
descriptions to use in order to understand and explain a given
phenomenon. These choices are often intuitive and subcon-
scious, dictated by the dominant behaviors of the system, as
well as by the research questions being answered, the
availability of instrumentation, and the researcher’s training.
But the choice of certain descriptions over others can
dramatically influence how a researcher conceives of their
system, as well as how they make, study, and use the resulting
research products.
The philosophy of science is the study of these choices and
of scientific reasoning itself. As a branch of epistemology (i.e.,
the theory of knowledge), philosophy of science investigates
the nature of scientific reasoning and the implications of
scientific theories for both understanding the natural world and
acting in it. Philosophers of science examine scientific
methodology as a whole, investigating the conditions for
successful scientific explanation, the relationships between
causation and the laws of nature, and whether and in what
sense the various branches of science can be unified with one
another. Philosophers of science also examine individual
sciences, answering questions such as, “Can we reduce the
human experience of consciousness to patterns of electrical
signals in the brain?”, “Should we trace the origins of life to
metabolism or replication?”, or “If the physical world is really
governed by quantum mechanics and relativity, why does
classical mechanics work so well for so much of science?”
Answering these questions is not a matter of collecting data
nor of interpreting the results of individual experiments. Rather,
it is a matter of conceptual analysis: evaluating the implications
of understanding a scientific concept in one way rather than
another. In nanoscience, for example, one can conceive of
colloidal nanoparticle synthesis as either building a molecule or
growing a crystal. Conceiving of a synthesis as molecular will
suggest certain models, synthetic protocols, and character-
ization strategies. Conceiving of a synthesis as crystallization
will suggest others.
Collaboration between scientists and philosophers of science
reveals new domains for conceptual analysis and new research
opportunities for both philosophers and scientists. Philosophers
trained in conceptual analysis can provide expertise in
evaluating what is gained, and what is lost, by using one
conception over another. Which conception(s) we use can
influence every aspect of scientific work, including the ways we
think about material systems and what experiments we design.
These concepts also influence the ways we communicate, who
we communicate with, and perhaps most importantly, the very
research questions we ask. In this Viewpoint, we give examples
of collaborative conceptual analysis by introducing the benefits
and limitations of importing bulk-scale concepts of matter into
nanoscale research using two canonical examples: the concepts
of surface and alloy.
Consider first the idea of a surface: an interface between two
phases of matter. This is a well-formed concept for bulk
materials, meaning that there are both mathematical and
empirical methods of representing, predicting, and explaining
the behavior of material surfaces.1,2 It is also an essential
concept for nanoscale research, where differences in surface
functionality can dictate differences in chemical and physical
properties. Surface chemistry even plays a taxonomic role in
nanomaterials, which distinguishes the classification of nano-
materials from the classification of bulk materials.3
However, the concept of a surface disappears in molecular
research, where the notion of a phase boundary is largely
irrelevant to the description of molecular species. (Of course,
the word “surface” is used throughout physical chemistry in
terms such as “isosurfaces” or “potential energy surfaces”.
However, in these examples, the term “surface” refers to a visual
representation of a physical parameter but does not necessarily
imply a physical boundary between two distinct phases).
Recently, researchers in the philosophy of science have argued
that many concepts in science, including the concept of a
surface, are “scale-dependent,”4−8 meaning that the use of these
concepts changes as a function of the length, time, and energy
scales of the system.
Although scale-dependence may sound obvious to many
chemists, it has broad-ranging implications for the structure of
scientific theories, and it is offered as an alternative to models of
science that say laws of nature govern natural phenomena full-
stop (i.e., laws such as F = ma are either always true or never
true, rather than true at the scale of classical mechanics). At the
molecular scale, then, the concept of a surface simply does not
describe relevant relationships among phenomena, functions, or
laws of nature.
As nanoscientists make materials smaller and smaller, they
must ask the question: when are continuum descriptions of
surfaces (e.g., their surface energy) no longer appropriate? In
other words, what are the conditions under which the use of
models that contain surface concepts fail to be relevant to the
description, prediction, or explanation of a system? For
example, few nanoscientists would hesitate to say that a 20
nm diameter nanoparticle has a surface. But does it provide
useful predictions about physical or chemical properties to talk
about the surface of a 7-atom cluster, or even a 25-atom cluster?
It is well known that continuum descriptions of surface
properties such as surface energy and surface curvature are
useful predictors of surface behaviors. However, if the surface
concept is abandoned in models of small clusters, what remains
are atomistic models that describe the behavior of the system
from the bottom up. These approaches are remarkably
powerful in obtaining information about particle electronic
structures, as well as associated information about particle
physical properties including reactivity, optical absorption, and
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vibrational phenomena.9−11 For example, if we want to predict
the reactivity of a 7-atom cluster, then modeling the electronic
structure of the cluster is more likely to predict observed
behaviors accurately than predicting cluster reactivity based on
its “surface curvature”.
Next, consider the concept of an alloy, which is typically
defined as a solid solution of metals.12,13 In the bulk, these
metal mixtures can contain grains of one metal or another that
are over 1 μm, much larger than the dimensions of metal
nanoparticles,14−16 and in nanostructured bulk metals, grains
can be 40 nm or larger.17 The size, shape, and distribution of
grains influence numerous physical and chemical properties of
the resulting material, including thermal transport, corrosion
resistance, and hardness.16 Indeed, a common theme in bulk
alloy research is the manipulation of grain structure to induce
changes in properties.15,18−20 Yet, in multimetallic nanomateri-
als, the much smaller, nanoscale distribution of metals also has
a dramatic influence on final particle properties.21 Here, the
introduction of even a single heteroatom impurity can
significantly alter particle electronic structure.22 Although
grain boundaries can still play a role in describing nanomaterial
structure and properties, they do not often provide the
structural details necessary to comprehensively model the
system’s behaviors.
What is gained, and what is lost, by conceiving of
multimetallic nanoparticles as alloys? When should we expect
that individual atoms in nanoparticle alloys will behave like
grains in macroscopic alloys, and when should we abandon the
analogy and focus on the impact of atomistic properties (e.g.,
individual bond lengths or atom electronegativities) on the
observed properties of the nanoparticle? Treating the different
metal regions of a nanoparticle like grains in a macroscopic
alloy suggests research questions about the overall quantity and
distribution of heteroatoms, whereas treating them like
individual atoms suggests research questions about electronic
structure that require atom-level detail.
This conceptual analysis not only influences the ways in
which we ask and answer scientific questions, it also impacts the
ways we approach philosophical ones. For example, studying
the relationship between the bulk-like and molecular models of
nanomaterials prompts questions about whether all matter is
“really” quantum-mechanical and classical mechanics serves
merely as a convenient computational shortcut, or whether
parts of the world are “really” classical. Nanoscience lies at the
edge between the classical and the quantum realms, and
consequently, it is common (and likely necessary) to use both
bulk and atomistic descriptions of a material in nanoscale
research. It may even be necessary to develop new, unique
descriptors as well. We expect that, like the wave-particle
duality that continues to govern our conception of light, the
dualistic conception of nanomaterials as quantum and classical,
bulk-like and molecular, will prove a lasting and fruitful way to
understand nanoscale phenomena. And like the wave-particle
duality, what makes for the most productive description for a
given experiment is a matter of both the nature of the nanoscale
world and what research questions one hopes to answer.
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